In this paper we analyse the development of corporate environmental management systems through the core elements of the emerging evolutionary theory of the firm. The environmental management process means a process by which organizations change their structures and cultures as a result of an interlinked effort of individual learning and organizational transformation. We propose that effective environmental management capacities derive primarily from the adaptation of three constitutive mechanisms of firms: the coordination mechanisms, the cognitive mechanisms and the incentive mechanisms. Our theoretical results are supported by case studies in 12 industrial firms localized in France (Alsace) and in Germany (Baden-Wurtemberg).
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the development of corporate environmental management systems through the core elements of the emerging evolutionary theory of the firm. Even if the evolutionary theory of the firm is still in development, we can note, following Cohendet et al [1] , that there exist many propositions quite fruitful for the analysis of organization's evolution. The philosophy of this emerging theory could be summarized by the following quotation: "… the firm is an economic institution which performs multiple functions by implementing different mechanisms which interact in complex, sometimes conflicting and still largely unexplored ways. We maintain that a theory should abandon the uni-dimensional view of most current approaches and try to address specifically the interaction among such mechanisms, seeing the firm (and economic organization in general) as a delicate balance between such interacting processes" [1, p.3] .
We propose to analyse these mechanisms and their evolution, through an important and new challenge for industrial firms; the perception and the management of ecological issues. Partly because of growing public concern over environmental problems and partly because of increasing pressures from the government, one can note some changes in organizational structures and management practices in order to assign responsibilities for environmental issues and to develop clean technologies.
If the firm is considered as an organization of individuals who make decisions, the way in which the individuals create new knowledge and coordinate their actions is essential in the determination of organization's environmental performance. According to Cohendet et al [1] , this coordination task can be achieved by a set of different mechanisms, which are the following: the incentive mechanisms, the coordination mechanisms and the cognitive mechanisms. While all these mechanisms finally contribute to a coherent coordination of the firm's activity, they emphasize different types of instruments to achieve this.
Coordination mechanisms emphasize the role of hierarchy, structural arrangements and rules in bringing together individual actions to meet a defined set of (e.g. environmental) objectives, and local and centralized learning processes to drive organizational change in a given direction. The cognitive mechanisms emphasize the development of a collective knowledge basis as another key to the coordination of individual actions and groups. Since solving environmental problems related to products and production processes often requires new skills and capabilities, cognitive mechanisms are essential for adapting the collective knowledge basis accordingly. Incentive mechanisms, finally, emphasize the 'payoff structure' on the individual and group levels which are intended to guide the firm's actions. With respect to environmental quality, these incentive mechanisms reflect the evolution of benefits and costs associated with environmental actions.
The following sections will set out each mechanism in more detail. Each section characterizes a mechanism first theoretically than empirically. The empirical results are derived from case studies (realized by face-to-face interviews) in twelve industrial firms localized in France (Alsace) and in Germany (Bade-Würtenberg). They cover automobile industries, refinery industries, electric and electronics industries, mechanical and surface treatment industries and brewery industries.
The role of coordination mechanisms
Very little research has been done in the economic field to analyse the way firms organize their environmental decisions and their impact on coordination, hierarchy and delegation [2] . In fact, firms' environmental innovations result partly from a combination, specific to each firm, of management techniques (life cycle analysis, environmental audits, value analysis...) and management structures. In this sense, although the adoption of these techniques passes through a phase of learning by doing, this does not mean that they are always implemented and exploited in appropriate structures.
Theoretical foundations of coordination mechanisms and environmental management

The trade-off between centralization and decentralization
A central question outlined by different theories of the firm is the trade-off between centralization and decentralization of decisions. The comparison by Aoki [3, 4] and Itoh [5] of the A-firm (centralized structure) and the J-firm (decentralized structure) in models with incomplete information shows that the relative efficiency of these structures depends on the nature of uncertainty faced by firms. In extreme cases defined by stable or volatile environments for planning the hierarchical mode reveals to be superior. However when:
"external environments are continually -but not too drastically changing, the Jmode is superior. In this case, the information value created by learning and horizontal coordination at the operational level may more than compensate for the loss of efficiency due to the sacrifice of operational specialization" [4, p.9] .
Following this assertion, if we suppose that environmental policies and technologies do not follow abrupt changes but are modified by incremental adaptations through time, environmental management can profit from delegation at the operational level (rotation or effort allocation between environmental and production activities, integration of environmental responsibilities into job descriptions). In a paper relevant to compliance with environmental regulations, Beckenstein and Gabel [6] give a more precise conclusion about the way delegation and centralization are linked when firms' decisions are made with uncertainty as to their legality. In their model the decentralized decision structure is characterized by better top down information (legal aspects, audits) and monitoring which entail explicit costs. The centralized structure imposes standard operating procedures without supporting explicit costs. Decentralization reduces both the probability that legitimate and profitable actions would not be taken (type I error) and the probability that the firm unwittingly violates the law (type II error). Centralization reduces the probability of type II error while raising the probability of type I error. One of the model's relevant results for our purpose is that when the environmental risk associated to a project increases centralization is fostered. Although adopting a static and strict informational approach the paper of Beckenstein and Gabel points to a crucial point in hierarchical structures by overcoming the dichotomical conception between centralization and decentralization. Furthermore, their model suggests that the degree of strictness of environmental regulation can play an important role on the organizational structure.
Routines as coordination mechanisms
Using the concept of organizational routines can also help us to give a more complete and precise view of coordination mechanisms in firms [7] . Coordinative routines can be defined as problem solving action patterns. They determine the organizational learning paths and crystallize the knowledge acquired collectively through time by firms. They involve not only the explicit and codified mechanisms but include a tacit dimension, which makes them difficult to replicate and contribute to the firms distinctive competencies [8] . Furthermore, as firms have to adapt to environmental changes and find new ways of ensuring their viability, routines differ from mere rules. They have an incomplete and imperfect nature stemming from the limited and dispersed knowledge of firms' members facing new problems. Coordination in this context relies rather on rules to be interpreted than on rules to be executed [9, 10] .
In the context of environmental management the emergence of coordination routines can be evidenced in a twofold way. First, firms can develop their green strategy by shifting some of their successful management routines to environmental issues. The procedural similarities between standard management systems such as ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 justify this approach. This allows the application of past experience in a new domain and its use as a coordination mechanism for creating an environmental learning process in the firm. Past successful organizational routines (i.e. quality procedures) can then serve as a coordination basis to introduce environmental objectives. An incremental logic is at work in this particular case.
Second, the development of new environmentally friendly processes and technologies needs to be driven by environment specific routines. These are in no way pre-existing in firms but must be elaborated through coordinated search procedures. There is also the risk that environmentally viable routines are incompatible with other existing routines. It is then important to have a coherent policy taking into account the interdependencies among different management aspects.
Team-based approach and environmental units
Although decentralization constitutes a way to establish a participative structure, the models cited above do not distinguish it from a team-based approach. When important organizational or technological changes are required, a team-like approach could replace decentralization and serve as a structuring factor in the decision process. In the context of environmental management, conflicting representations among different functions can impede change. Effective cross functional teams can be constituted to internalize the necessity for change and develop new ideas, strategies and technologies.
As outlined by Romme [11] :
"teams are the key learning units which can best absorb and produce novel information, whereas the hierarchy acts as a stabilizing factor by processing and storing important learning results (by transforming team information into relatively objectivated, confirmatory information" [11, p.414 ].
This argument suggests also that a coherent learning process is based on a trade-off between team-like and hierarchical structures in terms of exploration vs. exploitation [12] , dynamic vs. static routines [13] , or double loop vs. single loop learning [14] . The circular hypertext organization structure analyzed by Nonaka [15] constitutes an efficient way to switch between different information contexts through different organizational modes. In this sense, by adopting a proactive environmental policy, teams are indispensable to generate new information and knowledge. On the other hand a switch to hierarchy is indispensable for diffusion, objectivation and socialization of the knowledge generated by teams. The establishment of environmental units in industrial firms is one of such organizational arrangements [16] . We can interpret the creation of such units as a necessity for the firm to have a 'robust' knowledge basis. Because the ecological environment of the firm is continuously unpredictable, the centralization of information in an environmental unit allows the constitution of stable and global representations of ecological problems. One example of such common knowledge is the conception of some Environmental Plan or Audit which presents the quantification of the environmental effects of firms' activities.
Coordination mechanisms: some empirical facts
The case studies show that firms form at the first stage punctual project groups or nominate experts in charge of specific environmental issues. In this phase environmental management procedures are practically non existent and in most of the cases only top and middle management are involved in decision making. Only in the second stage, firms create a stable structure which evolves through time towards more decentralization. The creation of such a formal structure leads also to the emergence of modes of coordination based on procedures which partially substitute or complement hierarchical coordination modes.
The structural aspects
A coordination approach adopted by some firms relates to linking quality and environmental management. Two firms belonging to the electronic sector have strongly integrated these aspects. Their size and the fact that they elaborated a separate environmental management system constitute a significant factor for explaining their specificity. In one of the cases, environmental management is directly delegated to the quality manager who elaborates and controls the environmental procedures. In the other case one person is specifically charged with environmental issues. His function is to centralize the environmental requirements, to ensure the technological evolution and to search for improvement solutions. The main role of this function is to organize the projects and to ensure the coherence between quality and environmental management. This coordination principle through multidisciplinary and vertical work teams is also adopted by the other firm but through a more simplified structure due to the absence of an environmental unit. A common feature to these firms is the absence of a decentralized environmental management organization at the level of production units. In other words the coordination structure and the work teams are essentially vertically organized.
For the other cases, an important observation is the presence of a decentralized organization structure for environmental concerns. The differences between these firms stem essentially from the localization of the environmental unit at the management level and the way work groups are constituted. In two cases the environmental unit belongs to the General Service Departments which also provide services related to water and energy supply, as well as waste treatment. In another case the environmental unit is integrated with the Technical and Investment Department. In all three firms, these departments are directly linked to the productions units. At each production unit, a person is charged with organizing the environmental management. This structure emerged in these firms through the desire to decentralize the environmental decisions at the production level but also to intensify the horizontal coordination procedures.
Environmental procedures as coordination rules
The cases we observed allow us to distinguish three modes of coordination by rules. This distinction is mainly based upon the specialized or general nature of these rules and their formal and tacit character.
Firstly, we consider the adoption of standard environmental systems, such as ISO 14001 or EMAS, as a formal and specialized approach. These standards have been adopted in our sample by seven firms and are considered as a way to rationalize and institutionalize the environmental procedures. In most of the cases the development of these standards passes through a top down and a bottom up approach. The function of the bottom up approach is to adapt the environmental methodologies. The setting-up of these coordination tools requires a global vision of the different processes through vertical work groups. Their role is to centralize the critical information in order to integrate them into the procedures and then to diffuse them to the operational services.
A second category of cases, environmental coordination rules although having a codified nature are developed in the specific context of quality management. These firms consider generally environmental management as quality management. They explicitly underline the positive effects of quality management rules on environmental aspects.
A third approach based more on tacit coordination rules prevails in firms having integrated environmental protection issues into a more global management system. These firms make no clear-cut distinction between environmental coordination mechanisms and other systemic coordination mechanisms. The environmental policy does not lead to an additional management system but favours the evolution of the existing one through its adaptation to environmental criteria.
These three modes of coordination can be considered as complementary rather than exclusive. For example, nearly all the firms having obtained the ISO 14001 certification have previously adopted the ISO 9000 norm. In other words, pre-existing coordination rules have guided the actions of these firms to develop their environmental management system.
The role of the environmental unit
The way the environmental function, and its unit, is organized in a firm depends principally upon the size of the firm. But, in all the firms of our sample, we observe that the major role played by such a function is the coordination of environmental actions and the development of rules, procedures and documents that centralize new competencies and knowledge. It appears that the work of environmental managers is focused on the 'socialization' of environmental representations.
The role of cognitive mechanisms
In the evolutionary theory, the firm is viewed as an organization bringing together the individuals who make decisions. In this view, decision making -i.e. choosing an 'appropriate' action in response to a new problem posed by a changing environment -is a core element determining the firms' performance. The question is then to find how the firm acquired competencies and knowledge over time. Therefore, the success of the integration of environmental issues in industrial organizations depends on their capabilities to create new knowledge and to change organizational routines through learning processes.
Theoretical foundations of cognitive mechanisms and environmental management
Representations and knowledge in environmental management
According to Kim [17] and Nonaka [15] , a good way to understand individual knowledge is to distinguish two main elements in knowledge. The first one is the concept of 'mental models' which represent a person's view of the world. These representations provide the context in which new material is viewed and interpreted and they determine how stored information is relevant to a given situation. They include paradigms and viewpoints that provide representations helping individuals to perceive and define their world. By contrast, operational knowledge represents skill or know-how, which implies the physical ability to produce some action. These two elements, which constitute the tacit knowledge of Humankind, are the core capacities of individuals to take effective actions. But competencies and knowledge do not reside only in the minds of managers. The organization's knowledge is also a complex set of 'shared mental models' and routines. These routines are executable capabilities to generate actions or to guide action sequences in a context that has been learned by the organization in response to selective pressures [18] . In fact, this complex of routines determines what the organization recognizes as meaningful in the environment and thus it strongly influences how the organization learns and perceives opportunities.
In such a theoretical context, the integration of environmental issues in the firm's activities demands not only the 'cleaning' of existing technologies, but also requires capabilities to turn environmental constraints into viable business opportunities. This depends on whether the firm is able to create the required new knowledge and capabilities. In fact, the environmental management requires a redefinition of norms and representations.
The environmental representation of a firm defines the worldview that its managers and members share. It encompasses their beliefs, assumptions and values regarding the relationship of the firm to its natural environment. The understanding of this relationship will have a decisive impact on the environmental strategy of the firm [19] . We have established elsewhere that reactions of firms can be ranked in three categories, according to the implication of the firm in the environmental problems and capacities to handle opportunities deriving from such environmental issues. These reactions are: offensive strategy, characterized by 'anticipating and proactive' innovation behaviour, defensive strategy, characterized by 'resisting' innovation behaviour and adaptive strategy, characterized by 'imitating' innovation behaviour [20] .
But environmental management must also become a core norm which determines the decision-making processes of the firm and the theory-in-use of the members. Because the natural environment has not achieved its proper place in management practices, decisionmakers are too often faced with seemingly insoluble conflicts between environmental protection and economic success. In fact, the use of polluting technologies is the result of decision processes that are led by existing activities and established routines. These existing rules satisfy the firm's aspiration level because their assessment does not include environmental issues. Such behaviours appear also because improving knowledge within frequently used rules increases the frequency with which these rules result in successful outcomes, and thereby increase their use. In fact, innovation opportunities for companies are limited by path dependencies, organizational routines and acquired knowledge. These core capabilities may act as core rigidities.
Individual competencies and environmental training
Any transformation of knowledge implies a learning process: training and education, but also direct experience or learning from others, frequently through intensive interactions among members of the organization.
According to Gilbert [21] , the establishment of this environmental training program is essential in order to remove the suspicions about environmental management among personnel. Moreover, it is important that training takes place at all levels of the organization in order to introduce environmental issues into the different decision making processes. But the training program must also be an ongoing process and not just a one-off exercise: the program should continually reassert the importance of environmental issues and affirm the responsibilities of each member to environmental management within the organization. In fact, the benefits of integrating environmental training with other management subjects are important: this integration reduces the source of conflict in the mind of trained personnel and equips them better for decision making in their dayto-day activities.
Organizational learning through 'team work'
One can note that changing the basic assumptions and vision of an organization is a very difficult task because those elements form the foundation for the organization's routines. In fact, the integration of environmental issues in the firm will require an organizational 'double-loop learning process' which connects the failures of the theory-in-use "not only to strategies and assumptions for effective performance but to the very norms which define effective performance" [14, p.22] . Organizational learning, as individual learning, is "the way in which firms build, supplement and organize knowledge and routines around their activities and within their cultures, and adapt and develop organizational efficiency by improving the use of the broad skills of their workforces" [22, p.377] .
The 'environmental learning process' needs a process by which organizations change their cultures as a result of an interlinked effort of individual learning and organizational transformation. Environmental management requires then completely new values and norms: ecological efficiency is not achieved by technological change alone, it is also achieved by profound changes in the goals that drive organizational activities.
But organizational learning is more than the sum of the parts of individual learning [14, 23] . Indeed, very often, learning in an organization takes place by members sharing work practices. Thus, greater sharing of experience leads to greater organizational learning. According to Kim [17] , the intangible and often invisible assets of an organization reside in individual mental models that collectively contribute to the shared mental models. Such social constructions of knowledge are supported by social networks of members which provide feedback and review mechanisms among staff.
The use of both cross-functional and departmental teams provides access to data that relate to the entire plant, and focuses on specialized issues and processes associated with individual departments. Although many of the environmental opportunities appear to be departmental -or process-specific -the evaluation of these opportunities and their implementation require interdepartmental involvement. Indeed, "teamwork within the company guarantees that all relevant divisions take part in the project, pool their knowledge, apply their individual know-how to other areas, develop creativity and together support the solutions" [24, p.44] . The integration of personnel from various departments into cross-functional teams will help the company in understanding its needs. Moreover, people on the shopfloor have a key role to play because they are close to the activities and incidents which may cause environmental impacts, and, if they are trained and motivated, they should be able to recognize and respond to needs for environmental performance improvement.
Cognitive mechanisms in case studies: some empirical facts
The 'representations' of environmental issues
In our sample of case studies, we find different categories of environmental strategies, which represent in fact different representations of environmental issues. First, in all German firms of the sample we observe that the protection of environment is a core element of the organizational culture. The integration of environmental issues is analysed and implemented in a systemic way, that is all parts of the organization are involved in the environmental strategy. The main objective of this systemic approach is to generate synergies between traditional activities and environmental protection.
A second group is composed of French firms owned by foreign companies (German, American or Japanese). In these production units, the environmental representations are based on the strategies of the head office. Thus, environmental management practices are determined at the head office and diffused in a 'top down' manner throughout the production units. In our sample, it seems that for these units environmental protection is an important part of the 'hierarchical' organization culture.
The last group of firms could be characterized by an adaptive approach concerning environmental management. Until recently, the environmental dimension played a minor role in these companies strategies. Only regulation pressures and citizen associations have pushed these firms to integrate environmental issues in their business practices.
Individual competencies and training
It is important to note that, except in one case, we don't observe specific and long-term recruitment (like an environmental manager). In fact, we observe that the responsibility for environmental management is entrusted to senior managers who have strong scientific competencies (chemist, biologist) or management competencies (quality manager). This fact suggests that the firms manage environmental issues on the basis of existing human capital and competencies. Moreover, it seems that an effective integration of the environment needs experience in traditional activities. All the firms of our sample have introduced training programs for their managers and employees. In fact the main objective of this training is to introduce environmental issues into the mainstream of decision making by creating attitudes which will enable managers to recognize and fully consider the environmental consequences of their actions.
Organizational learning through 'team work'
A great part of the interviewed firms have organized cross-functional and departmental teams in order to manage environmental problems. Even though the structure of these teams is very variable, they have the same objective: to establish links between the different hierarchical levels and between the different important units of the plants. Such organizational arrangements are essential for a good and effective transmission of information and data, but also for the transmission and exchange of experiences and knowledge inside the firm. Moreover, in some firms, these teams play an important role in the management of potential conflicting representations between units or managers. But teamwork also induces mutual control between the members of the team. Indeed, for some firms, operational control is considered as an important factor for the success of environmental management. The collective elaboration of relevant targets and measurement and verification that all environmental activities are carried out clarify the responsibilities of each member, not only through the hierarchical structure but also inside the team.
The role of incentive mechanisms
Incentive mechanisms can be envisaged on two principal levels: as an element of the firm's interaction with its environment (external incentives) and as mechanisms within the firm, on the level of departments, units or the staff (internal incentives). This section investigates both levels as well as their interactions.
Theoretical foundations of incentive mechanisms and environmental management
External incentives faced by the firm as a whole
A first approach to analyse incentives which act on the firm as a whole is via a simplified neo-classical view, where the firm is seen as a profit maximizing unit. Following this logic, the introduction of any additional constraint necessarily leads to a deterioration of results, e.g. higher costs, reduced revenues etc... Another line of enquiry is pointed out by Sinclair-Desgagné [25] where the nature of sanctions by the government imposed on firms for non-respect of environmental norms will directly influence their internal decision structure and incentive policy.
Internal incentives to cope with diverging interests
The recent developments of the principal-agent approach strongly emphasize incentive mechanisms as constitutive element of a firm's internal organization. Here, the firm is basically perceived as a bundle of bilateral contracts designed to achieve coordination by imposing the appropriate incentive scheme. The need for incentives results from the presence of diverging interests and opportunistic behaviour. In this context, incentives serve to optimally allocate efforts among tasks and to direct individual action toward a common goal. A similar perception of the firm as a nexus of bilateral contracts is apparent in the Coasean tradition [26, 27] and further theoretical developments stress the coordination of diverging interests as the key aspect of incentive mechanisms [4, 28] .
Internal incentives to disclose and coordinate decentralized knowledge
In the evolutionary approach the divergence of interests is not considered a danger which requires appropriate incentive schemes to cope with it, but rather such a divergence is considered as a chance to enhance performance. Larger emphasis is put on the role that incentive mechanisms play in directing organizational learning and in allowing the organization to respond flexibly to a turbulent environment. In this perspective, incentive schemes are required to stimulate local learning and diversity and to determine the intensity and direction of organizational search for alternative routines. Further, they are required to foster coordination among actions and processes. While incentives are seen as factors that drive learning, on the other hand, they are seen as subject to learning themselves (see Coriat and Dosi [29] for this line of enquiry).
Incentive mechanisms and environmental management: some empirical facts
External incentives faced by the firm as a whole
Our empirical analysis has revealed revenues and costs as equally important dimensions of the effects of external incentives for a firm's environmental activities. Some firms observe that their clients begin asking for environmental quality in production or in the product. In such changing markets ensuring or enhancing environmental performance becomes a necessity to assure the loyalty of customers and to stabilize revenues in face of changing demand. Some of the evidence on cost effects related to the pursuit of an environmental objective seems to support the neo-classical proposition, that this will raise the level of costs. However, contrary to what neo-classical theories of the firm would predict, cost reductions have also been observed. These were mostly linked to environmental measures which work via a reduction in resource use. From these observations we conclude that the effects of integrating the environmental challenge into a firm does not necessarily have a negative impact on its performance. Rather, the impact depends on how the external incentives are translated into the internal incentive structure and how the firm exploits the room for manoeuvre that it has in adapting to the constraint.
Internal incentives to cope with diverging interests
On the level of departments or units, a distribution of (environmental) costs according to the 'polluter pays' principle inside the firm was found. This approach is primarily chosen by large enterprises. In these cases departments are treated as cost centres. The remuneration scheme incites them to manage their wastes so as to maximize the revenues from valorization and to minimize disposal costs. This logic is in line with what transaction cost theory and principal agent approaches would predict on the design of incentive schemes. However, there is also a cognitive dimension to the observed mechanisms. The idea is that those decision makers who possess the best knowledge on possibilities and costs to valorize or reduce wastes should be entitled to additional revenues from environmental activities or be charged with the costs. Different from what the principal-agent approaches may suggest, financial incentives on the individual level of personnel play only a minor role in the environmental management systems. Bonus systems do exist in some of the investigated enterprises. However, they mostly do not explicitly take into account environmental criteria. The more important role of environmental evaluation criteria for personnel is probably their role in the context of 'management by objectives'. Here they serve to assess the performance of individual workers in the firm. This allows for self control and also hierarchical control. But the evaluation criteria were not found to be linked to short term financial repercussions for the actors.
Internal incentives to disclose and coordinate decentralized knowledge
Incentive mechanisms cover criteria and procedures by which pay-off structures inside the firm are determined. The criteria themselves contain important information on investment projects. Further, the procedures to justify investments and entire budgets serve as a platform to reveal this information and make it accessible to a wider circle of decision makers inside the firm than just to the staff immediately concerned. Thus, the incentive mechanisms presented below fulfil also cognitive and coordination tasks.
Investment appraisal procedures and criteria are found to vary with the category of investment made. If there is an environmental norm and if there is only one technical choice to comply with it, the investment is generally realized without further evaluation. If there are several possibilities to reach compliance or if the investment decision concerns voluntary measures, a mix of environmental and economic criteria is applied. We found a decisive impact of the investment costs alone. This can be explained in the context of an 'artificial' quantitative capital constraint, which the budget represents once it has been fixed. But another interesting feature of the appraisal procedure concerns the importance of the payback time. If the payback time lies above a predefined threshold, an investment is considered as strategic and hence requires the participation of the top management. In this perspective the criterion does form part not only of an incentive scheme but also of a coordination mechanism, which allows a division of tasks between technical experts for 'standard' investments and the strategic management for more complex investment decisions.
Concerning the environmental evaluation, some firms use different forms of environmental impact analysis and life cycle analysis. The advantage is that conflicts and incompatibilities in different environmental objectives are revealed and can be treated explicitly. The case studies also show that a more detailed assessment of the environmental impacts facilitates the integration of the economic and environmental evaluation dimensions. Such an integration allows to assess possible trade-offs between the environmental and economic objectives in case the two dimensions yield opposing investment priorities. In the context of an integrated evaluation several enterprises referred less to the notion of 'economic profitability' but to the notion of 'economic acceptability' of a project.
In the budgeting procedures, departments or investment projects compete for financial resources. Generally, the top management or the controlling department determines the individual budget volumes by referring to the detailed demands of the environmental manager or other heads of unit. The consent to a budget may be interpreted as a kind of remuneration for the departments, who take their decisions according to the firm's priorities. However, the cognitive features inherent in the budgeting procedure are more pervasive. The procedures impose an incentive to reveal the reasons for an environmental investment and support a cognitive mechanism which serves to centralize local knowledge on capital needs. Further cognitive effects result from the integration of environmental budgets in general budgets. We found one case where the environmental unit has completely abandoned its own investment budget to the advantage of the production units, yet it is entitled to participate in the decision on the kind of investments made. The production units thus cannot shift on possible environmental costs accruing for environmental features to the environmental unit.
Conclusion
Our aim in this paper was to analyse environmental management by using the evolutionary framework and defining the firm through three generic mechanisms: coordination, cognitive and incentive mechanisms. Our results show that, in the context of environmental management, all three mechanisms play a crucial role in guiding the learning processes and co-evolve through acquired new knowledge.
The coordination of environmental activities can be taken as a first indicator of how firms integrate them in the decision process. In the firms we studied, the position of the environmental department and his role in the organizational chart can only be precisely explained in relation to its interactions with other organizational units. The importance of vertical and horizontal work teams in some case studies is explicitly related to the necessity for firms to create new and specific procedures that integrate environmental, quality and productivity criteria. Furthermore, routines and rules serve as coordination tools in two respects. They also constitute a common knowledge base on which actors base their actions. Several firms have mentioned the use of quality management routines, for example, as an important coordination mechanism to develop new environmental procedures.
Concerning cognitive mechanisms, the evolution of competencies plays a central role in the environmental integration process. Successful integration depends on the coherence between pre-existing competencies on the one hand and the new competencies developed in the context of environmental management on the other hand. Two elements -teamwork and the environmental unit -play a crucial role in the management of cognitive aspects. A team-like organization is adopted in several firms for the elaboration of new environmental procedures and environmentally friendly products and processes. The environmental unit plays a complementary role in this context by coordinating the different local learning processes and represents a focal point for codifying and confirming procedures and centralized information.
Finally, our work shows that a complete and systemic characterization of incentive mechanisms concerning environmental management calls for a multi-level analysis: on the firm level, on the departmental level and on the individual level. Particularly in the case of large firms we observe an evolution over time towards an integration of specific environmental incentives and criteria into general incentive schemes, such as a delegation of environmental investment responsibilities to cost centres in production. Especially investment appraisal and budgeting procedures go far beyond being purely instrumental for the implementation of incentives and reveal strongly cognitive and coordinative effects.
It seems important to notice that the three mechanisms we studied are strongly interdependent. The process that led some firms for example to the creation of cost units resulted both from structural dispositions and from a more accurate representation of each unit's environmental impact. It is also the necessary coherence between these mechanisms that seems to explain why environmental integration is mostly realized through incremental rather than radical organizational innovations.
